here This article divides into four parts. Part I details the historical context surrounding the British government's pursuit of a sovereign credit rating in 1976. A 'triple-A' credit rating would help the performance of British bonds in the New York bond market. Good demand from American investors, in addition to borrowing from the Euro-dollar market, would in turn help the government to manage existing debt more effectively. Nevertheless, fears of a low rating and economic tumult inhibited progress. Part II explains the shifting attitudes within the government concerning a credit rating in 1977. As confidence grew, encouraged by economic improvement and market insights from leading investment banks, the government eventually decided to contact Standard and Poor's and Moody's to discuss a rating. Part III considers the British government's preparations and subsequent discussions with both agencies in early 1978. The meetings were a success. Although the consequent 'triple-A' ratings reflected the improved state of the economy, the government's efforts to influence the process were also important. Part IV details the subsequent success of the government's bond issuance in New York in the spring. American investors appeared to share the same opinion as the credit rating agencies that the United Kingdom was a 'triple-A' borrower.
I.
International interest in the New York bond market emerged in the mid-1970s. Since 1963, US capital controls in the form of the Interest Equalisation Tax (IET), a domestic levy designed to reduce the outflow of US capital that restricted foreign debt issuances, had made the issuance of debt prohibitively costly to foreign borrowers. 21 By 1974, the American Moody's and Standard and Poor's were rating eight countries. figure 3) . In 1981 alone, the amount totalled more than $5bn.
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Figure 3 here
The government decided to spread the repayment of maturing debt by adopting a twoleg strategy of early repayments and fresh borrowing. The Treasury and the Bank of England correctly believed that the balance of payments would soon benefit from the proceeds of
North Sea oil, a recent and valuable addition to the national coffers. 49 As these benefits would last until the end of the century, it made little sense to run a large current account surplus over the following years simply to wipe out any outstanding debt by 1984. Such a policy could encourage deflation and damage the regeneration of British industry.
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The British government's debt management strategy was well underway by the end of 1976. The government had already repaid or arranged to repay about $2bn of debt in advance of maturity. Indeed, Healey would manage to repay the most recent IMF loan before he left 46 office. 51 The government had also begun to consider issuing a bond in the New York bond market. Borrowing from American investors, in conjunction with the Euro-dollar market, provided more options with which to smooth out the repayment schedule of maturing external debt. The government's strategy nevertheless carried risks. If economic recovery stalled and confidence collapsed, consequently forcing the rapid depletion of reserves and heavy short-term capital outflows, the government would struggle to borrow money. The whole cost of debt would have to be financed from a current account surplus. In the absence of any such surplus, the government would be 'confronted with a 1976-type crisis of illiquidity.' 52 Furthermore, for the strategy to work, the British government believed it needed to secure an excellent sovereign credit rating. Beyond harming marketability, a poor rating could limit the breadth of the American market. US regulations required many institutional investors to purchase securities bearing specific ratings. 53 In addition, a good rating could reduce the cost of borrowing in other markets. 54 Throughout 1976, then, the British government chose to wait patiently before seeking a sovereign credit rating.
II.
In early 1977, Morgan Stanley resumed its efforts to persuade the British government to seek a sovereign credit rating. Senior officials all recognised the 'civilised but quite high-pressure salesmanship' at play. 55 Morgan Stanley would certainly benefit from managing the British government's debt issuance. 56 Mangers of an issue obtain most of their fees from 'the spread', which refers to the discount at which all bonds are sold by the issuer to the 51 struggled to provide an answer. He responded that 'no tree grows to the sky' meaning growth in Germany and Japan was beginning to ease, putting Britain in a better light.
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The accuracy of Healey's claims is debatable, especially his confidence about the viability of economic reforms within the Labour Party. In his memoirs, for instance, his opinions on matters such as taxation and industrial performance were far more complex. 146 Nevertheless, his performance played to his audience and recognised the importance of convincing his assessors. Still cautious of a lower rating, these discussions all occurred in the strictest confidence. Indeed, given the risk of a leak following a formal application, the government had already prepared a number of vague but ultimately disingenuous statements concerning its pursuit of a rating. 147 The efforts of the British government paid dividends. Morgan Stanley said 'some very flattering things about quality of Treasury's presentation to Standard and Poor's'. 148 The
Moody's presentation went equally well. 149 None of this is to suggest that the rating analysts unquestioningly accepted all of their hosts' claims. Analysts may have lacked experience of the sovereign ratings process, but there is no reason to believe that they were gullible. 150 To be sure, the question for the credit rating agencies was likely only whether the United Kingdom deserved a 'triple-A' rather than a 'double-A' rating. Nevertheless, the rating agencies had come to London, 'eager to be persuaded', and British efforts would prove sufficiently convincing. In early April, officials began to prepare for the Budget speech, working on the assumption that the United Kingdom would secure the highest ratings. 154 Following advice from Morgan Stanley, the British government decided to follow the announcement with a sale campaign or 'road show' conducted in the United States to publicise the offering, although the chancellor declined to participate. 155 If announced on 11 April, the road show would begin on 17 April. 156 Officials developed a series of short briefs, categorised as either defensive points to remove popular misconceptions about the British economy or positive points to sell the bond. 157 The costs associated with a New York bond issue, however, were The archival record is unclear as to when Moody's gave its 'triple-A' verdict, but they had certainly informed the government by early April. Concern grew within the Treasury as to whether Standard and Poor's would produce its rating in time for the budget, although few doubted that 'they will come up with the right answer.' 159 By 10 April, the day before the Budget announcement, the rating agency confirmed a 'triple-A' rating. 160 Standard and
Poor's later explained the delay by suggesting that 'the UK was not an "open and shut" case' for a 'triple-A' rating', but provided no further details. 161 It is unclear whether Standard and Poor's was more pessimistic than Moody's. The archives provide no insights into the latter's position. There were certainly differences in the rating process, as evidenced by the dissimilar assessments of Finland's creditworthiness (see figure 1 and table 1 ), but such a delay could also simply reflect procedural differences in the decision-making process. rate such an issue 'triple-A', the highest credit rating they can award.' His explanation remained consistent. 'I believe that by spreading the burden of debt repayment forwards and backwards in this way we can ensure that it does not unduly restrict our ability to expand our economy.' 165 Healey had thus announced to the world that the United Kingdom was a 'triple-A' borrower.
The press response was largely favourable. Although unable to complete a write-up in partly induced by good management.' 167 The government had certainly convinced the rating agencies. The Financial Times noted that Moody's report, 'may strike British readers as portraying a somewhat better Britain than the one they know, but it made a good story.' 168 The same newspaper nevertheless explained that although this move might appear to be a 'publicity gimmick', which 'makes a useful international status symbol', it did provide access to the largest capital market in the world.
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On hearing the rating, the investment banks managing the issue telephoned the Bank of England with unanimous advice to proceed with a bond of $350m split into two tranches; £200m at 7 years and £150m at 15 years. 170 Since mid-March, when the government had decided to move ahead, the market had fallen. 171 Keen to act, the chancellor formally approved the bond issue in New York later that day. The British bond offering would be the largest non-US offering in the market to date. 172 Following advice from the banks managing the issue, the chancellor agreed to bring forward the issue from 8/9 May to 26/27 April because interest rates in New York were moving against the government. 173 The seven-year tranche was issued at an agreed coupon of 8½%. The 15-year tranche was issued at a coupon of 8⅞%. There was good demand for the bonds, especially for the 7-year tranche, which quickly sold out. 174 Performance remained respectable after the conclusion of the underwriting syndicate, with Morgan Stanley subsequently reporting that 'U.K. bonds stand at the top of the list' in the secondary market. 175 The British government had managed to secure rates as good as any sovereign borrower. There was also the added bonus of opening up opportunities for British firms to borrow in New York. 176 value in the market. 178 To be sure, a credit rating was not necessary for British entry in the New York bond market, as evidenced by Brazil and Mexico. In addition, good timing and competitive pricing had helped the issuance. Nevertheless, the British government and
Morgan Stanley consistently assumed a relationship between a 'triple-A' rating and good borrowing rates. 179 Regulatory changes in America during the 1970s meant that investment groups, insurance companies, and pension funds could only invest in financial products with a certain level of creditworthiness. 180 The British government certainly recognised ratings' 'important influence' on 'the breadth of the market [...] in that some U.S. institutional investors are required by law to purchase only securities bearing at least certain specific ratings.' 181 Rewards also extended well beyond the New York market. The prestige associated with a favourable rating could help to lower borrowing costs in existing markets and served to highlight skilful economic management to a domestic audience. 182 The British government's efforts to secure a 'triple-A' rating cast light on an important period of revival in the history of sovereign credit ratings. Between 1974 and 1985, the two major agencies were rating approximately a dozen countries, the majority of which were 'triple-A' borrowers. This period was therefore unique in both its limited size and its lack of ratings diversity. The archives also reveal that many states sought the advice of financial experts to guide them through the ratings process. Morgan Stanley's insights, and advice concerning the prospectus and subsequent talks, certainly strengthened the British 
